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The Fate of BitTorrent John Does: 
A Civil Procedure Analysis of 
Copyright Litigation 
Patience Ren* 
Copyright owners can trace online violations to an infringer’s Internet protocol address 
but cannot identify her unless they obtain court approval to serve a subpoena on an 
Internet service provider. As the most popular peer-to-peer file-sharing protocol today, 
BitTorrent requires users to share files with each other in a conspiracy-like fashion. By 
arguing that this feature imparts a “same transaction” character to BitTorrent 
infringement activities, a copyright owner can seek to join multitudes of Internet protocol 
addresses as John Doe defendants in an application for early discovery. Courts are 
divided as to whether early discovery should be granted where tens, hundreds, or 
sometimes thousands of Internet protocol addresses are joined together in one case. Many 
in the Internet user community fault copyright owners for using the courts as a mere 
instrument to seek identification information en masse as part of a coercive practice to 
induce monetary settlements. This Note examines how case law relating to early discovery 
and civil procedure joinder rules applies to multiple defendants allegedly participating in 
a “same transaction” that occurs solely within the inner workings of a file-sharing 
protocol. Even if BitTorrent usage legally supports joinder, this Note highlights the 
difficult balance between the right to enforce a copyright and the rights of Internet users to 
be free from litigation threats. Without a legislative response that is resilient in the face of 
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Introduction 
On May 24, 2010, Voltage Pictures, L.L.C. filed a complaint against 
five thousand unnamed individuals who allegedly used a peer-to-peer file 
transfer (“P2P”) protocol called BitTorrent to illegally download Voltage 
Pictures’ copyrighted and award-winning motion picture The Hurt 
Locker.1 The defendants were unidentified John Does because their 
infringing activities could only be traced to their Internet protocol (“IP”) 
addresses.2 The court granted early discovery against all the defendants 
and allowed for the subpoena of identification information corresponding 
to each IP address from Time Warner and other Internet service providers 
(“ISPs”).3 Upon receiving the subpoenas, the ISPs provided notice to the 
defendants, informing them of their right to quash the subpoenas.4 
Without a successful challenge, the ISPs would be required to turn over 
subscriber information such as names, phone numbers, and addresses. 
Voltage Pictures subsequently received identification information on a 
rolling basis and requested several extensions of time to serve the 
defendants, which the court also granted. Public outcry ensued, branding 
this practice a “copyright troll.”5 One blog calculated that if putative 
defendants agreed to monetary settlements of $2000 each, Voltage 
 
 1. Voltage Pictures, L.L.C. v. Doe, 818 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31 (2011). 
 2. An Internet protocol address is a unique number that identifies a computer or device 
connected to a network. 
 3. Voltage Pictures, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 32. 
 4. Id. at 32 n.3. 
 5. Third Degree Films v. Doe, No. 12-10761-WGY, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142079, at *1 n.1 (D. 
Mass. Oct. 2, 2012). 
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Pictures and its attorneys would likely net millions, a number that is 
comparable to or more than The Hurt Locker’s U.S. box office sales.6 
In April 2011, Voltage Pictures voluntarily dismissed 557 putative 
defendants,7 implying that Voltage Pictures received satisfactory 
settlements from the dismissed defendants. A large number of the 
remaining defendants filed motions to quash based on several grounds, 
one of which was improper joinder.8 According to the defendants’ 
argument, there was no evidence to suggest that all of their alleged 
conduct constituted the same transaction or occurrence under Rule 20 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so there was no justification for 
joining multiple defendants in one lawsuit. The court rejected that 
argument and found joinder to be proper because the unique features of 
BitTorrent require online download and upload activities to occur in a 
collective fashion, satisfying the standard of “same transaction [or] 
occurrence” as required by Rule 20.9 
Voltage Pictures is representative of hundreds of massive John Doe 
litigation cases that populate the dockets of district courts around the 
country.10 An issue common to these cases is whether defendants’ conduct, 
including the use of the BitTorrent protocol, constitutes the same 
transaction or occurrence to justify joinder during early discovery. The 
analysis requires a detailed examination of how the protocol operates to 
exchange files online.11 Courts are divided on this joinder issue, and the 
decision of Voltage Pictures to grant joinder is far from being the 
consensus. On one hand, many courts closely follow the reasoning of 
Voltage Pictures. They conclude that the facts pleaded in the complaint 
satisfy joinder requirements because of the unique technological features 
of BitTorrent, which mandate simultaneous uploading and downloading 
in groups called “swarms.”12 On the other hand, other district courts have 
rejected this “swarm” theory as inadequate to meet the standard of the 
“same transaction [or] occurrence” required by Rule 20.13 
 
 6. Julianne Pepitone, 50,000 BitTorrent Users Sued for Alleged Illegal Downloads, CNNMoney 
(June 10, 2011, 3:59PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/10/technology/bittorrent_lawsuits/index.htm. 
 7. Voltage Pictures, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 32. 
 8. Id. at 38. 
 9. Id. at 40. 
 10. See, e.g., infra notes 150, 156–195; see also Media Prods. v. Does, No. 12 Civ. 3719 (HB), 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125366, at *5 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2012) (listing BitTorrent cases and commenting 
that “[i]t is difficult to even imagine the extraordinary amount of time federal judges have spent on 
these cases”). 
 11. See Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. 
L. 695, 721 (2011). 
 12. See infra notes 156–166. 
 13. See infra notes 186, 189–191. 
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The issue of joinder in online copyright infringement cases is not 
completely new to the courts; it also arose during the first flood of John 
Doe litigation launched by the Recording Industry Association of 
American (“RIAA”) in early 2003.14 The RIAA lawsuits followed on the 
heels of court decisions that held liable P2P service providers that 
induced online copyright infringement.15 Although such decisions snuffed 
out P2P technologies like Napster and Grokster,16 P2P usage was 
anything but dampened,17 and the John Doe litigation did not disappear 
after RIAA lawsuits waned.18 A new wave of John Doe litigation has 
recently emerged, targeting users of BitTorrent.19 BitTorrent replaced 
the older technologies and is currently the most popular P2P protocol,20 
boasting more than 150 million users and accounting for almost half of 
upload traffic during peak times.21 
Because the BitTorrent litigation shares similarities with the RIAA 
litigation, the older decisions form a legal backdrop against which the 
courts now adjudge BitTorrent cases. Akin to the RIAA litigation, 
BitTorrent cases are filed against end users who actually participated in 
the transfer of copyrighted files, as opposed to P2P service providers who 
developed or supported the tools for file transfer.22 Defendants in both 
the RIAA and BitTorrent litigation were initially named John Does and 
identified only by their corresponding IP addresses.23 In both generations 
of lawsuits, the plaintiffs seek to aggregate claims against a large number 
 
 14. David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual 
Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1685, 1702–08 (2005); 
David Kravets, File Sharing Lawsuits at a Crossroads, After Five Years of RIAA Litigation, Wired 
(Sept. 4, 2008, 2:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/proving-file-sh. 
 15. E.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 16. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005) (holding that, by 
harboring an intention to promote to Grokster users a method of copyright infringement, defendant is 
liable for the resulting infringement by the third-party users); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 
653 (7th Cir. 2003) (shutting down Aimster); Arista Records L.L.C. v. Lime Group L.L.C., 715 F. Supp. 
2d 481, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that LimeWire, a Gnutella client, induced copyright infringement). 
 17. Bridy, supra note 11, at 703; Ankur R. Patel, BitTorrent Beware: Legitimizing BitTorrent 
Against Secondary Copyright Liability, 10 Appalachian J.L. 117, 119 (2011).  
 18. See, e.g., Adam Langston, Note, Return of the John Doe: Protecting Anonymous Defendants in 
Copyright Infringement Actions, 41 Stetson L. Rev. 875, 879–85 (2012) (reviewing the history of 
copyright litigation since the RIAA litigation). 
 19. See, e.g., id. 
 20. Bridy, supra note 11, at 703; Patel, supra note 17, at 119. 
 21. BitTorrent and µTorrent Software Surpass 150 Million User Milestone; Announce New 
Consumer Electronics Partnerships, BitTorrent Inc. (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.bittorrent.com/intl/es/ 
company/about/ces_2012_150m_users; BitTorrent and Netflix Dominate America’s Internet Traffic, 
TorrentFreak (Oct. 27, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-and-netflix-dominate-americas-
Internet-traffic-111027. 
 22. For example, litigation against P2P users launched by RIAA. See infra note 129. 
 23. Eliot Van Buskirk, RIAA to Stop Suing Music Fans, Cut Them off Instead, WIRED (Dec. 19, 
2008, 7:26 AM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2008/12/riaa-says-it-pl. 
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of defendants into single cases. RIAA lawsuits eventually tapered off 
after 2008, when RIAA obtained preliminary agreements from the ISPs 
to cooperate in RIAA’s fight against online piracy.24 However, critics 
claimed that the real reason for abandoning the lawsuits was that the 
litigation strategy did nothing to decrease copyright infringement and 
only increased negative publicity for RIAA.25 
Differences in technology cause the BitTorrent litigation to differ in 
significant aspects from the RIAA litigation. First, RIAA’s attempts to 
join several IP addresses were mostly based on the fact that the addresses 
were derived from a single ISP, such as a network on a college campus, 
and not much more. Although the question of joinder sometimes arose in 
the RIAA litigation, courts could easily find improper joinder for reasons 
unrelated to the type of P2P protocol employed. This was because in the 
RIAA cases, each of the multiple defendants allegedly downloaded 
different songs, owned by different plaintiffs, and there was no evidentiary 
support that they constituted the “same transaction, occurrence, or series 
of transactions or occurrences.”26 Unlike the RIAA cases, each BitTorrent 
case is concerned with only one copyrighted work. 
Second, courts in the RIAA litigation neither reached a consensus 
nor had to delve deep into the legal issues27 because, unlike BitTorrent, the 
older P2P technologies did not have any features in support of joinder, 
such as simultaneous uploading and downloading in a “swarm.” Most 
importantly, the exact type of P2P technology was not a concern to either 
the courts or the parties.28 These differences are the centerpiece of the 
BitTorrent plaintiffs’ arguments in distinguishing their cases from those 
of RIAA. Thus, the BitTorrent plaintiffs’ argument for joining multiple 
defendants mainly rests on the intrinsic nature of the BitTorrent file-
sharing scheme. Another reason why the issue of joinder was not of great 
concern to RIAA was because RIAA launched this crusade as much to 
send a message to stem online piracy as to recoup losses from copyright 
infringement. As such, joining multiple defendants might not have been 
 
 24. Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 
2008, at B1, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A). 
 27. See infra notes 28, 129. 
 28. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Does 1–9, No. 07-1515, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27170, at *3 (W.D. 
Pa. Apr. 3, 2008) (not disclosing the protocol used by plaintiffs but noting that they merely used the 
Internet); BMG Music v. Does 1–4, No. 3:06-cv-01579-MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53237, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. July 31, 2006) (identifying that the plaintiffs used the same ISP, Covad Communications, but not 
disclosing the P2P protocol); Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Does 1–9, No. 04 Civ. 2289 (RWS), 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 23560, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2004) (finding that the defendants used the FastTrack 
network); Interscope Records v. Does 1–25, No. 6:04-cv-197-Orl-22DAB, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27782, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004) (noting that plaintiffs were using FastTrack, the protocol of 
several older P2P clients such as Grokster and KaZaa). 
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RIAA’s top priority because obtaining a large sum of damages from one 
defendant could very well accomplish RIAA’s objective of publicizing 
the penalty associated with piracy. 
Small movie and adult film companies, which constitute the majority 
of plaintiffs in this recent influx of Doe litigation,29 all share the same 
incentive of joining large number of defendants. These lawsuits essentially 
underlie a business model where it is only financially worthwhile if the 
names and addresses of multitudes of defendants can be subpoenaed in 
one filing. The usage of BitTorrent by defendants can make for a strong 
joinder claim since the means by which files are transferred over the 
BitTorrent network in groups called “swarms” may meet Rule 20’s 
“same transaction and occurrence” requirement. 
The BitTorrent plaintiffs first link IP addresses to instances of 
infringing activities by monitoring the BitTorrent network. Then the 
plaintiffs need to overcome a major procedural hurdle to pursue their 
claims following the filing of a complaint. Before the BitTorrent plaintiffs 
can serve complaints on the Doe defendants—identified only by their IP 
addresses—the plaintiffs need to obtain identification information, such 
as the names and addresses connected to the IP addresses from ISPs like 
AT&T and Comcast. However, Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires court approval for such a subpoena.30 When a court 
issues this discovery order, the court often imposes conditions pursuant 
to its discretion to protect persons affected by the subpoena.31 Such 
conditions often include a notice to accompany the order instructing the 
ISPs to distribute information to the Internet service subscriber to inform 
her of her rights and options, such as filing a motion to quash the 
subpoena.32 
Although the subpoena is sought in the name of serving the 
defendants so as to proceed with litigation, it is commonly assumed that 
the plaintiffs are only interested in obtaining identification information 
for a large number of IP addresses in one fell swoop in order to secure 
 
 29. See Jason Koebler, Porn Companies File Mass Piracy Lawsuits: Are You at Risk?, U.S. News 
(Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/02/02/porn-companies-file-mass-piracy-lawsuits-
are-you-at-risk. Later, publishing and video game companies joined this litigation frenzy. See, e.g., 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Does 1–30, 12 Civ. 3782 (LTS)(JLC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135468 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2012); Aerosoft GMBH v. Does 1–50, No. 12-21489-CIV-SEITZ/SIMONTON, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68709, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 16, 2012). 
 30. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(3) (“The clerk must issue a subpoena, signed but otherwise in blank, to a 
party who requests it.”). 
 31. Id. 45(c)(3)(B). 
 32. CP Prod. v. Doe, No. CIV 2:12-cv-0616 WBS JFM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107045, at *4 (E.D. 
Cal. July 30, 2012) (“The subpoenas required the ISPs to notify subscribers of the IP addresses whose 
information was to be released so that the subscribers would have an opportunity to file objections or 
motions to quash with the court.”). 
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monetary settlements from putative defendants.33 After a defendant pays 
the proposed settlement amount, the plaintiff then voluntarily dismisses 
the case against the defendant. The assumption that plaintiffs have no 
intention to pursue the claims to judgment or even to serve the defendants 
is reasonable because the strategy for profitability rests in the economies 
of scale of quick settlements from a large number of defendants.34 
Accordingly, joining a large number of defendants in one filing is key to 
the plaintiffs’ business model. 
Although the plaintiffs may legally justify joinder of a large number 
of defendants in a single case based on the swarm features of BitTorrent, 
they encounter a different type of hurdle in the public sphere that raises 
normative concerns. A defendant who receives an offer letter to settle 
for $3000, for example, often feels compelled to pay in order to avoid the 
hassle of litigation. For example, one of the many oft-circulated news 
stories publicizing the alleged predatory activities of plaintiffs involves a 
grandmother who was ignorant of the importance of securing her wireless 
connection. Unidentified neighbors might have used her wireless 
connection to infringe on copyrighted works. A BitTorrent plaintiff then 
accused the grandmother of downloading, for example, “Nude Nuns with 
Big Guns.”35 A grandmother defendant with unsecured wireless who 
receives such a settlement letter from an adult film company becomes the 
poster child for the many protests in the P2P user community.36 The public 
outcry against such behavior underscores the need to address the 
normative concerns for parties on both sides of the BitTorrent litigation. 
The BitTorrent litigation thus presents new challenges to the courts 
faced with this application of joinder rules to “transactions [or] 
occurrences” that exist solely in cyberspace and are coordinated only by a 
P2P protocol. In the absence of actual intent to litigate the claims, the 
plaintiffs’ strategy in joining a large number of defendants is contrary to 
the purpose of judicial economy and trial convenience—the underlying 
purpose served by joinder in the rules of civil procedure. 
 
 33. James DeBriyn, Note, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright 
Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 79, 90–94 (2012) (describing how 
plaintiffs use mass litigation as a business model). 
 34. This strategy of plaintiffs is not unique to P2P cases, nor is it new. See, e.g., Buck v. Robinson, 
42 F. Supp. 697 (S.D. W. Va. 1942) (finding for the defendant in a case where the American Society of 
Composers, Authors, and Publishers sued a restaurant for performing copyrighted songs); see also 
Fight Copyright Trolls, http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
 35. Keegan Hamilton, The Five Funniest Porn Titles Involved in BitTorrent Piracy Lawsuits, Seattle 
Weekly (Aug. 11, 2011, 12:31 PM), http://blogs.seattleweekly.com/dailyweekly/2011/08/the_5_funniest_ 
porn_titles_bittorrent_piracy_lawsuits.php. 
 36. See, e.g., James Temple, Lawsuit Says Grandma Illegally Downloaded Porn, S.F. Chron, July 
15, 2011, at D1. 
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Currently experiencing a great influx of these cases, courts around 
the country are divided as to whether early discovery should be granted 
to a case in which tens, hundreds, or sometimes thousands of IP 
addresses are joined together as putative defendants. The plaintiffs’ 
reliance on the detailed operation of the BitTorrent technology places 
joinder rules of civil procedure front and center in a controversy to an 
extent never before confronted by the courts. Some courts maintain that 
joinder is proper at this early stage of the case, while others sever the 
parties on the grounds of misjoinder or lack of personal jurisdiction. The 
divide over whether to grant plaintiffs early discovery while joining a 
large number of defendants exists not just between circuits but persists 
even within the same federal district. The legal issue each district focuses 
on differs slightly and thus sometimes leads to different grounds for the 
various holdings. Nevertheless, the issue of joinder remains a recurring 
theme in all circuits and is the focus of the analysis here.37 
This Note argues that the lack of a suitable means to resolve disputes 
between copyright owners and consumers forces copyright owners and the 
courts to apply civil procedure joinder rules in unintended ways. Part I 
describes how the BitTorrent protocol differs from older P2P technologies 
and how the current copyright enforcement scheme fails to address the 
needs of copyright owners here. Part II examines how previous case law 
involving older P2P technologies stands up to this new technology in the 
context of the BitTorrent litigation. This Note argues that the lack of 
consensus among district courts demonstrates that the Napster, Grokster, 
and previous Doe cases do not provide adequate guidance for this 
renewed struggle between copyright owners and P2P users. Lastly, Part 
III concludes that a new copyright enforcement mechanism, such as an 
alternative to lawsuits, is imperative not only to curtail the frustration 
currently experienced by the district courts, but also to discontinue the 
perverse application of civil procedure rules. 
I.  Background: The Rise of BitTorrent Litigation 
A.  Basics of BitTorrent Litigation 
The rise of BitTorrent litigation coincided with a trend in P2P usage 
that never existed before. While the number of music file transfers has 
remained relatively constant since the RIAA litigation, the transfer of 
TV shows and movies has grown tremendously.38 Relative to older 
 
 37. See, e.g., infra notes 155–196. 
 38. Eric Bangeman, P2P Traffic Shifts Away from Music, Towards Movies, Ars Technica (July 5, 
2007, 9:26 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2007/07/p2p-traffic-shifts-away-from-music-
towards-movies.ars. 
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technologies, BitTorrent is well suited to handle the large files necessary 
for TV shows and films, as it surpasses other existing P2P protocols by 
accomplishing complete decentralization and mandating file sharing, 
eliminating many of the common technological inefficiencies of older 
P2P protocols.39 
Because BitTorrent is currently the top P2P protocol, data suggest 
that the quantity of infringing activities it enables is staggering, reaching 
over 99% of the P2P network traffic.40 Although there is controversy about 
whether file sharing through BitTorrent leads to a reduction in profits to 
copyright holders,41 it is undisputed that the majority of the traffic is 
infringing.42 Owners of video and film copyrights are especially vulnerable, 
and in 2010 they started to file lawsuits to recoup their financial losses. 
Especially considering the economic woes that have befallen smaller 
entertainment industry players in the past few years, the BitTorrent 
plaintiffs might warrant more sympathy in comparison to the RIAA 
plaintiffs—popularly viewed as big and oppressive music companies.43 
B.  The File Distribution Scheme of Older P2P Protocols and  
Its Problems 
Older P2P protocols adopt certain aspects of the traditional client-
server model, where the client requests information from a server, which 
in turn seeks to fulfill that request.44 Although a centralized server does 
not store files in a P2P network, the server’s job is to match clients to 
establish P2P connections upon a request.45 The server also indexes all of 
the files available for download so as to properly translate a file request 
into an appropriate connection.46 The peers share certain resources with 
others in the network, such as files, storage space, or processing power.47 
As a network grows due to an increasing number of peers, not only are 
more files available for search, but options to find a faster downloading 
source also increase. On the other hand, since all queries are routed 
through a central server, increased usage of the P2P network often leads 
 
 39. Ashwin R. Bharambe et al., Microsoft Research, Analyzing and Improving BitTorrent 
Performance 2 (2005). 
 40. Bridy, supra note 11, at 709–10. 
 41. Stan J. Liebowitz, Economists Examine File-Sharing and Music Sales, in Industrial 
Organization and the Digital Economy 145 (Gerhard Illing & Martin Peitz eds., 2006). 
 42. Bridy, supra note 11, at 709–10. 
 43. Steve Friess, Porn Industry Sweats Recession, Piracy, AolNews (Jan. 9, 2011, 10:39 AM), 
http://www.aolnews.com/2011/01/09/porn-industry-facing-hard-times-in-struggling-economy. 
 44. Patel, supra note 17, at 119. 
 45. See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Software 
located on the Napster servers maintains a ‘search index’ of Napster’s collective directory.”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Col Perks & Tony Beveridge, Guide to Enterprise IT Architecture 190 (Springer 2003). 
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to a bottleneck, decreasing the efficiency of searches and file transfers.48 
In an attempt to mitigate congestion at the central server, later 
generations of P2P protocols adopted various decentralization schemes 
that ranged from mini-servers to complete decentralization.49 
While congestion at a central server might be eliminated, the 
decentralization of P2P protocols raised searching and connection issues. 
A successful file transfer still requires searching for an available file owned 
by a peer on the network and establishing a connection with that peer for 
the duration of the transfer.50 Unstable connections and increased file 
requests could still render the network unstable or incapacitated.51 
Another major inefficiency problem confronted by the P2P 
communities is the lack of cooperation among peers sharing with each 
other, a phenomenon called “free riding.”52 Users may derive a benefit 
from downloading but may be reluctant to provide any uploads. Without 
any incentive for users to gift, a P2P network can include up to 70% of 
downloaders who never upload.53 An increasing number of downloaders 
in a decentralized system can also create bottleneck situations akin to 
those found in a centralized system—if they do not also correspondingly 
contribute to sharing their files as uploads in the network. 
C.  The File Distribution Scheme of BitTorrent 
Unlike the older file-sharing protocols, BitTorrent provides a better 
user experience with faster download speed by increasing the efficiency 
of file transfers through two main features: (1) network decentralization 
and (2) mandatory simultaneous uploads and downloads in a group. 
Incidentally, decentralization is also the main reason why BitTorrent 
lacks a central infringement-inducing entity for purposes of lawsuits and 
why it slips under the radar of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.54 
BitTorrent elegantly solves the problems encountered by the older 
generations of P2P, in large part, by mandating simultaneous downloads 
and uploads in a “swarm-like” fashion. A BitTorrent peer not only 
 
 48. Yung-Ming Li et al., Analysis of Scale Effects in Peer-to-Peer Networks, 16 IEEE/ACM 
Transactions on Networking 590, 590 (2008). 
 49. Bridy, supra note 11, at 699–700. 
 50. Stephanos Androutsellis-Theotokis & Diomidis Spinellis, A Survey of Peer-to-Peer Content 
Distribution Technologies, 36 ACM Computing Surveys 335, 346 (2004). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Murat Karakaya et al., Free-Riding in Peer-to-Peer Networks, 13 IEEE Internet Computing 
92, 92 (2009); Lei Liu et al., Experimental Investigation of a Peer-to-Peer-Based Architecture for 
Emerging Consumer Grid Applications, 1 J. Optical Comms. & Networking 57, 57 (2009). 
 53. Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, First Monday (Oct. 2, 
2000), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/792/701. 
 54. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010) (stating that §§ 512(c) and (h) 
are only applicable to service providers that store data). 
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downloads content, but is also mandated to serve content to other peers. 
The system made this possible because a file in BitTorrent is broken 
down into fragments called blocks.55 Uploading and downloading a file in 
blocks led to two important characteristics of BitTorrent. First, a file 
transfer connection is no longer restricted to peers who possess a 
complete file. Uploading from one peer can immediately start once that 
same peer downloads her first block of a file.56 As such, BitTorrent 
protocol can mandate a peer who just finished downloading a first block 
to upload that same first block during the same time the peer proceeds to 
download her second block. Second, file transfer is not limited to a one-
on-one transfer where one peer obtains her file solely from one other peer. 
A peer can download different blocks of a single file from different peers 
in a group. For example, a user may obtain the first block of the file from a 
first peer, the second block from a second peer, etc. This collectivity of 
peers sharing a file at any given time is called a “torrent” or “swarm.”57 A 
peer in a torrent that has a complete file is called a “seed” while a peer that 
is in the process of acquiring a file is a “leecher.”58 Every torrent requires 
at least one seed to remain in the torrent and to serve the multiple 
leechers. Aside from mandating simultaneous uploading and downloading, 
there is also a mechanism by which peers providing a fast upload rate to 
other users preferentially receive downloads.59 As such, the simultaneous 
downloading in a swarm as well as the tit-for-tat feature allows the 
network to grow sustainably.60 
Similar to how Internet surfers rely on Internet search engines to find 
websites of interest, BitTorrent users rely on indexing websites, such as 
PirateBay, to search for files.61 In a decentralized network like BitTorrent 
where files are located in different peer locations, an indexing website 
serves a similar function as a card catalog in a library to help users find 
specific titles in the library stacks. These websites operate independently 
from the BitTorrent protocol and provide indexing information to 
BitTorrent users so the users can locate the swarm of peers sharing the file 
of interest and establish a connection to the swarm.62 Accordingly, these 
websites could be exposed to secondary liability based on the purpose of 
inducing infringement and the profit-generating nature of their services. 
 
 55. Bram Cohen, Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent 1 (2003). 
 56. Id. at 2. 
 57. Raymond Lei Xia & Jogesh K. Muppala, A Survey of BitTorrent Performance, 12 IEEE 
Comms. & Tutorials 140, 141. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 142. 
 60. Birdy, supra note 11, at 702. 
 61. Patel, supra note 17, at 137–42. 
 62. Id. 
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Indeed, Congress has attempted to curb their activities.63 Unlike the 
indexing websites, BitTorrent protocol itself could be difficult to shut 
down because it exists merely as a software protocol that is completely 
decentralized and without claimed ownership. 
D.  BitTorrent and Copyright Infringement 
Research data and expert testimonies based on the Napster and 
Grokster litigation support the conclusion that the majority of the P2P 
traffic is infringing. The numbers presented to the courts in these older 
lawsuits were either over 90% or high enough to support the plaintiffs’ 
claims.64 Copyright infringement culpability is no different for BitTorrent. 
One study found that only about 1% of the files in a BitTorrent sample 
were non-infringing,65 while another found that only 0.3% of the files 
were non-infringing.66 
Published numbers suggest a significant loss of industry revenue, tax 
revenue, and jobs because of online piracy. However, the connection 
between massive job losses and infringement is controversial, as many 
studies showing this are supported or affiliated with the music industry. 
The metrics and assumptions inherent in the studies, such as directly 
correlating instances of piracy to lost sales of a copyrighted work, are 
questionable.67 Regardless of whether the studies correctly quantify the 
economic repercussions of P2P copyright infringement, the large amount 
of files illegally downloaded via BitTorrent does not appear to be 
disputed.68 
Centralized content distribution systems, the staple of the old P2P 
networks, provided static and easily identifiable targets for litigation and 
other enforcement efforts.69 Current copyright enforcement thus works 
best when infringing work is fixed on central servers.70 The expansive, 
 
 63. Id.; see Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, H.R. 3782, 112th Cong. 
(2012) (allowing the U.S. International Trade Commission to adjudicate cases involving foreign 
websites whose primary purpose is piracy); Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(a) 
(2011) (targeting Internet sites used for copyright infringement); Protect IP Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. 
§ 3 (2011) (investing the attorney general with the power to combat rogue websites). 
 64. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 922–23 (2005). 
 65. Jackie Cheng, BitTorrent Consensus: About 99% of Files Copyright Infringing, Ars Technica 
http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2010/01/bittorrent-census-about-99-of-files-copyright-infringing.ars. 
 66. Robert Layton & Paul Watters, Internet Commerce Sec. Lab., Investigation into the 
Extent of Infringing Content on BitTorrent Networks 1, 7 (2010). 
 67. Bridy, supra note 11, at 711; Stuart Corner, AFACT Repeats Claims: Over 90 Percent of 
BitTorrent Files Breach Copyright, ITWire (Sept. 20, 2011, 5:07 PM), http://www.itwire.com/it-policy-
news/regulation/49875-afact-repeats-claims-over-90-percent-of-bittorrent-files-breach-copyright. 
 68. Bridy, supra note 11, at 709–10. 
 69. Id. at 705 (citing Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 653, 658 (2003)). 
 70. Bridy, supra note 11, at 716 (citing Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of 
Internet Service Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 15, 41 (2006) (“[The 
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ever-changing BitTorrent community of anonymous members, together 
with the decentralized approach, makes it very difficult to shut down 
BitTorrent swarms.71 By eschewing a central server, BitTorrent minimizes 
its vulnerability—in distinction to the vulnerability of Napster—to the 
threats of existing copyright enforcement. Without a proper enforcement 
scheme or recourse outside of litigation to subpoena identification of 
infringers,72 filing a lawsuit became a copyright owner’s only answer. 
II.  Massive John Doe Litigation 
A.  Is Expedited Discovery Proper? 
A copyright-owner plaintiff who seeks to identify defendants known 
only by their IP addresses must apply for discovery in order to proceed 
with infringement claims. Rule 26(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure forbids a party from seeking discovery before a Rule 26(f) 
conference unless the court orders otherwise.73 A Rule 26(f) conference 
is an opportunity for parties to meet in order to develop a discovery plan. 
The plan will then be submitted to the court for review.74 In a John Doe 
litigation case, a Rule 26(f) conference is not possible because defendants 
have not yet been identified. Only when the court permits a Rule 26(d) 
exception for expedited discovery can the plaintiff discover the 
defendants’ identities and accordingly name the parties as defendants. 
Based on the express wording of Rule 26(d) and the want of 
pertinent appellate decisions, district courts wield broad discretion to 
determine whether to grant expedited discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) 
conference. Generally, a decision “to deny discovery will not be disturbed 
except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery results in 
actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.”75 Only if 
 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act] was designed to address a mainly centralized architecture. . . . 
Peer-to-peer architecture, by contrast, is decentralized and allows users to search for files stored in the 
libraries of other users.”)); see Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010) (stating that 
§§ 512(c) and (h) are only applicable to service providers that store data). 
 71. Patel, supra note 17, at 121. 
 72. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (stating that §§ 512(c) and (h) are only applicable to service providers that 
store data). 
 73. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d). 
 74. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(2). 
 75. Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 
287 F.3d 1193, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002)); see Ritchie Special Credit Invs., Ltd. v. U.S. Tr., 620 F.3d 847, 853 
(8th Cir. 2010) (holding that whether to “deny expedited discovery [is] committed to the discretion of 
the bankruptcy court” and that decisions would not be reversed “unless that court has abused its 
discretion”); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 795 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that 
despite having considerable latitude in determining the scope of discovery, the district court abused its 
discretion “when the discovery is so limited as to affect a party’s substantial rights” (citing Goldman v. 
Checker Taxi Co., 325 F.2d 853, 856 (7th Cir. 1963))). 
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there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been 
different had discovery been allowed can prejudice be established.76 
Exercises of broad discretion have led district courts to develop 
different standards that govern whether a court should grant expedited 
discovery: the Notaro standard, the reasonableness standard, and the 
good cause standard.77 These different standards result from practices 
that exist in different federal districts, and none have yet to be adopted 
consistently or exclusively in any one circuit. 
The Notaro standard is similar to that required in a preliminary 
injunction: (1) irreparable injury, (2) some probability of success on the 
merits, (3) some connection between expedited discovery and avoidance 
of irreparable injury, and (4) some evidence that the injury that will 
result without expedited discovery looms greater than the injury that the 
defendant will suffer if the expedited relief is granted.78 
Applying the Notaro standard, plaintiffs in these BitTorrent cases 
assert irreparable injury because ISPs keep log files of subscriber 
activities for only limited periods of time before erasing the data.79 
Accordingly, if they do not seek discovery in time to match identification 
information to the IP addresses that correspond to infringers, they lose 
their only means to seek redress for their injuries.80 The presumption that 
plaintiffs suffered injury because of illegal downloads, however, is 
controversial. Analogizing to previous lessons from the music industry, 
the alleged injury could be specious because not all illegal downloads 
represent sales that copyright owners would have actually made.81 
However, it was the testimonies of music executives and research studies 
from the music industry about such injury that ultimately persuaded the 
 
 76. Martel v. Cnty. of L.A., 56 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 77. Jesse N. Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery from Courts & Returning It to FRCP 26(d)(1): 
Using a Doctrine’s Forgotten History to Achieve Legitimacy, 64 Ark. L. Rev. 651, 661 (2011). 
 78. Notaro v. Koch, 95 F.R.D. 403, 405 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying the test to see if leave can 
be granted for the taking of depositions while recognizing that the test is from assessing the propriety 
of a preliminary injunction); cf. Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (applying the standard in 
a case involving a preliminary injunction). 
 79. See, e.g., Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–130, No. C-11-3826 DMR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
132449, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–11, No. 11-cv-01776-AW, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128889, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2011) (noting that ISPs keep “temporary internal logs 
that record the date, time, and customer identity for each IP address serviced”); Hard Drive Prods., 
Inc. v. Does 1–30, No. 2:11cv345, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119333, at *6 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2011) 
(“ISPs . . . keep the logs of these addresses for only a short period of time.”). 
 80. Cf. Protecting Children from Internet Pornographers Act of 2011, H.R. 1981, 112th Cong. § 4 
(2011) (“A commercial provider of an electronic communication service shall retain for a period of at 
least one year a log of the temporarily assigned network addresses . . . .”). 
 81. See, e.g., Liebowitz, supra note 41; Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File 
Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis (2004); cf. OECD Report, Digital Broadband 
Content: Music, DSTI/ICCP/IE(2004)12/FINAL (Jun. 8, 2005); Opderbeck, supra note 14. 
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Napster court.82 Given this legal backdrop, the rights owners should not 
have an impediment in establishing irreparable injury. 
Turning to the second and third prongs of the Notaro standard, the 
plaintiffs should also have no difficulty proving (2) some probability to 
succeed on the merits and (3) the connection between expedited 
discovery and avoidance of injury. The plaintiffs have started using 
forensic software, which has allowed investigators to observe the 
distribution of video (using the BitTorrent protocol) that is linked to 
individual defendants’ IP addresses. This forensic software further allows 
investigators to verify that the distributed file is the registered work.83 
Considering that the language, “some probability” and “some 
connection,” in these two prongs reflects general guidelines without a 
requirement for a heightened standard for specificity, plaintiffs are able 
to allege enough at the pleading stage to demonstrate the probability and 
connection needed to proceed. 
The last prong of the Notaro standard requires balancing the injury to 
the plaintiff without expedited discovery against the injury suffered by the 
defendant from expedited discovery.84 Courts’ application of this prong to 
decide whether to grant early discovery follows how the standard has been 
used in preliminary injunction cases.85 A typical situation where this prong 
can support granting early discovery is when a party wants to depose a 
person who would soon become unavailable. The objective here is to 
insulate defendants from “unfair” discovery for fear that defendants would 
not have enough time to prepare for the case and to hire an attorney.86 
Given the objective served by the last prong of the Notaro standard, 
the BitTorrent plaintiffs should also meet no obstacles in their application 
for expedited discovery. In comparison to cases where the expedited 
discovery involves a deposition, the balancing inquiry in the BitTorrent 
cases favors plaintiffs. First, their discovery request merely seeks a 
subpoena to order ISPs to reveal identification information. Second, the 
defendants have yet to be identified and the burden of discovery 
production rests on the ISP and not on the defendant.87 Third, the courts 
often narrowly fashion the scope of the expedited discovery to allow an 
 
 82. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015–17 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 83. E.g., Pac. Century Int’l, Ltd. v. Does 1–48, No. C 11-3823 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
116432, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011). 
 84. Notaro v. Koch, 95 F.R.D. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 85. E.g., Crown Crafts, Inc. v. Aldrich, 148 F.R.D. 151, 152 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (recognizing that 
courts have borrowed the Notaro standard for “the test for granting a preliminary injunction and 
applied it to requests for expedited discovery”). 
 86. Panoff, supra note 77, at 663–64. 
 87. But cf. Call of the Wild Movie, L.L.C. v. Does 1–1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(involving an ISP filing a motion to quash the subpoena because of the undue burden it faces with 
compliance). 
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opportunity for any defendants to contest the subpoena.88 Although 
defendants’ rights to anonymity89 and the expense required in contesting 
the subpoena could be an issue, plaintiffs here have made a prima facie 
case for their injury. They also lack alternative means to garner 
information necessary to proceed with their claims.90 Therefore, the 
recognizable injury to the defendants is relatively minimal, and an 
application of the Notaro standard in these BitTorrent cases favors 
granting limited expedited discovery to plaintiffs. 
The reasonableness standard is similar to the Notaro standard and 
does not compel a different result.91 The reasonableness standard takes 
into account all surrounding circumstances, including (1) whether a 
preliminary injunction hearing is pending, (2) the proposed discovery’s 
scope, (3) the purpose for requesting expedited discovery, (4) the burden 
placed on the defendant to comply with the requests, and (5) how far in 
advance of the typical discovery process the request was made. Since the 
Notaro standard originated as a test to be applied in a preliminary 
injunction case, courts developed the reasonableness standard as an 
alternative to avoid confounding a determination for expedited discovery 
with that for a preliminary injunction. Otherwise, in a case where there is 
an expedited discovery in connection with a preliminary injunction, 
courts find it less than ideal to apply the Notaro standard twice.92 Here, 
all the facts pertaining to the BitTorrent plaintiffs in favor of expedited 
discovery under the Notaro standard also would apply with equal force 
under the reasonableness standard. 
The final standard conditions expedited discovery on a finding of 
“good cause.” “Good cause” may be found where the “need for expedited 
discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the 
prejudice to the responding party.”93 Based on Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo 
 
 88. E.g., Pac. Century Int’l, Ltd. v. Does 1–48, No. C 11-3823 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
116432, at *22–23 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); Camelot Distrib. Group v. Does, No. 2:11-cv-02432 GEB 
KJN, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108816, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2011); Pac. Century Int’l Ltd. v. Does 
1–129, No. C11-03681 HRL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86779, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011); Call of the 
Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 340. 
 89. E.g., Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does, No. 11-7248, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41645, at *22–26 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 23, 2012) (refusing to enter a protective order to allow the defendants to proceed anonymously); 
cf. Sunlust Pictures, L.L.C. v. Cisa, No. 12-cv-00656-CMA-KMT, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150835, at *8–
9 (D. Colo. Oct. 19, 2012) (allowing movant to proceed anonymously but noting that “Fed. R. Civ. P. 
10(a), and Rule 17(a) specifically states that every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest”). 
 90. E.g., Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 352–53. 
 91. See Panoff, supra note 77, at 668. 
 92. Id. at 664–66. 
 93. Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see Pod-
Ners, L.L.C. v. N. Feed & Bean, 204 F.R.D. 675, 676 (D. Colo. 2002) (“[I] order expedited discovery 
upon a showing of good cause.”); Yokohama Tire Corp. v. Dealers Tire Supply, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 612, 
614 (D. Ariz. 2001) (“[T]he [c]ourt adopts a good cause standard to warrant the granting of any 
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Electron America, Inc., the good cause standard allows a trial court to 
grant expedited discovery where the Notaro standard would not, and the 
main reason for this broader discretion is the lack of an “irreparable 
injury” requirement.94 The Semitool court found that although the plaintiff 
did not allege “irreparable injury,” its argument pertaining to conservation 
of “party and court resources” was persuasive, for the benefit to the 
“administration of justice” outweighs the burden on the defendant. This 
standard is thus consistent with the general rule allowing trial courts wide 
discretion to manage discovery.95 
Some district courts apply a modified “good cause” standard when 
anonymous Internet users are named as Doe defendants. For example, 
many judges in the Northern District of California break down the 
analysis further into four requirements as set forth in Columbia 
Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com: (1) The plaintiff can identify the missing 
party with sufficient specificity that the court can determine that the 
defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal court; 
(2) the plaintiff has identified all previous steps taken to locate the elusive 
defendant; (3) the plaintiff’s suit against the defendant could withstand a 
motion to dismiss; and (4) the plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a 
reasonable likelihood of identifying the defendant through discovery such 
that service of process would be possible.96 
Because the good cause standard affords trial judges broader 
discretion to grant expedited discovery than the Notaro standard, it is an 
easier standard for the BitTorrent plaintiffs to meet. Even if one were to 
apply the situation at hand to the four requirements in Seescandy.com used 
in the Northern District of California, the BitTorrent plaintiffs should be 
able to meet the requirements. First, the plaintiffs would have submitted a 
list of IP addresses corresponding to the infringers found to be 
downloading their copyrighted works. Second, plaintiffs would have 
explained in the complaints how they went about identifying and verifying 
these infringing activities using their forensic software, as well as provided 
declarations to that effect. Third, these IP addresses are the key to 
locating the defendants. All these facts, as alleged by the plaintiffs, 
should also satisfy the essential elements of a copyright infringement 
 
expedited discovery prior to the Rule 26(f) scheduling conference . . . .”). 
 94. Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 276. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578–80 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see Sony Music 
Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that the Second Circuit 
adopts a set of similar factors: (1) a concrete showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm, (2) the 
specificity of the discovery request, (3) the absence of alternative means to obtain the subpoenaed 
information, (4) a central need for the subpoenaed information to advance the claim, and (5) the 
party’s expectation of privacy). 
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claim at the pleading stage to survive a motion to dismiss.97 Finally, as for 
the likelihood of being able to identify the defendant through such 
discovery, ISPs assign a unique IP address to each subscriber and retain 
records of subscriber activity. The information sought from the ISPs—
such as the names and addresses of the subscribers—will enable plaintiffs 
to serve defendants.98  
One might expect plaintiffs to fall short of the good cause standard, 
however, when probing deeper into the third prong of Seescandy.com: 
that the plaintiff’s suit against the defendant can withstand a motion to 
dismiss. Facially, it seems that the plaintiffs have duly fulfilled this 
requirement because all the elements of the copyright infringement claim 
are adequately alleged in the complaint. The evidence generated by the 
plaintiffs’ investigative efforts also corroborates the allegations. However, 
the plaintiffs’ joinder of multiple defendants, each represented by an IP 
address, warrants further analysis under the third prong because if joinder 
is improper a court is free to drop one or more parties that are joined. 
Improper joinder thus can lead to dismissing the action against one or 
more parties. Since Seescandy.com requires that the suit against the 
defendant be able to withstand a motion to dismiss, granting expedited 
discovery would hinge on whether the BitTorrent plaintiffs have properly 
joined the defendants. 
One question before proceeding to the joinder inquiry is whether 
misjoinder actually results in a dismissal as contemplated by the third 
prong of Seescandy.com. The Ninth Circuit in Gillespie v. Civilett,99 the 
case to which Seescandy.com resorted for its reasoning, asserts that early 
discovery should be granted unless a “complaint would be dismissed on 
other grounds,” while citing to cases in which discovery should have been 
granted because the complaints alleged facts under which a 
meritorious claim might be proved.100 Seescandy.com then elaborated on 
Gillespie and explained that the requirement of having a suit be able to 
“withstand a motion to dismiss” serves to protect “against the misuse of ex 
parte procedures to invade the privacy” of those who might not have done 
 
 97. See, e.g., Digital Sin, Inc. v. Doe, No. C 11-04397 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128033, at *4–6 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011); Third Degree Films v. Doe, No. C 11-02768 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
128030, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011); MCGIP, L.L.C. v. Does 1–30, No. C11-03680 HRL, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 88790, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011). 
 98. E.g., First Time Videos, L.L.C. v. Does 1–95, No. C 11-3822 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
116434, at *4–12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011). 
 99. Gillespie v. Civilett, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 100. Id. (citing Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978)); see Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. 
v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (holding that discovery is not strictly restricted to the merits of the 
case but should be allowed to litigate jurisdictional issues); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express 
Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430–31 n.24 (9th Cir. 1977) (vacating the lower court’s refusal to grant discovery 
because it is important in aiding a determination of jurisdiction). 
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anything wrong.101 The court held that a “conclusory pleading will never 
be sufficient” and emphasized that a plaintiff must have “standing to 
pursue an action against [a] defendant.”102 Accordingly, the specific 
concern for both Gillespie and Seescandy.com was whether the complaint 
alleged sufficient facts for a legal remedy and whether the plaintiff had 
standing. In light of this context, dismissing a case based on misjoinder is 
not exactly the type of dismissal contemplated by Gillespie and 
Seescandy.com. If Gillespie and Seescandy.com circumscribe dismissals to 
situations where insufficient facts were alleged for a legal remedy or 
where there is a lack of standing, the BitTorrent plaintiffs’ claims could 
survive the Seescandy.com test and should be able to procure expedited 
discovery. 
Nevertheless, a trial court armed with the broad discretion to 
manage discovery is free to examine misjoinder as a ground for 
severance without being constrained to a narrow interpretation of 
Gillespie and Seescandy.com. Severance does not necessarily lead to 
dismissal, as Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically 
states that misjoinder is not “a ground for dismissing an action” though 
“the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.”103 Despite 
this facial prohibition of dismissal based on misjoinder, a severance of the 
parties in BitTorrent cases practically results in dismissal. Because 
dismissal against the dropped parties is without prejudice, it is now the 
plaintiffs’ prerogative to file new suits against every one of those dropped 
individuals. 
However, it is not in the plaintiffs’ interest to lose the economies of 
scale by filing one suit against each individual defendant in response to a 
court-ordered severance. It is a well-known business model in cases like 
this that the plaintiffs would be unlikely to pursue the claims to 
judgment.104 Rather, once identification information is in hand, a plaintiff 
will send out a letter informing potential defendants of the advantages of 
settlement and the disadvantages thereof.105 Joinder is essential to 
maintain low filing and overhead costs in order to make filing these 
 
 101. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579. 
 102. Id. at 579–80. 
 103. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 
 104. See, e.g., Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Does 1–27, Civ. No. 07-162-B-W, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6241, at *18 (D. Me. Jan. 25, 2008) (rejecting the argument to adopt a heightened pleading standard 
even if plaintiffs are “using litigation . . . solely as a discovery mechanism, without actually intending to 
pursue their claims to judgment”). 
 105. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Springsteen Pissed at ASCAP for Implying He Instigated Lawsuit 
Against Pub; Demands His Name Removed, Techdirt (Feb. 5, 2010, 10:13 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/ 
articles/20100204/1525198055.shtml; USCG v. The People, Elec. Frontier Found., https://www.eff.org/ 
cases/uscg-v-people (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). 
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lawsuits worthwhile to copyright owners, and so satisfying joinder is an 
important hurdle the BitTorrent plaintiffs need to overcome. 
B.  Is Joinder Proper? 
Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the 
joinder of defendants if both of the following conditions are met: 
“(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in 
the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question 
of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”106 
Designed to enhance judicial economy and trial convenience, the rule 
encourages courts to entertain the broadest possible scope of action with 
respect to joinder of parties, claims, and remedies that is consistent with 
fairness to the parties.107 As a determination on expedited discovery, a 
trial court similarly wields broad discretion in deciding whether parties 
are properly joined.108 
Whether there is “any question of law or fact common to all 
defendants” is not disputed because the BitTorrent plaintiffs often have 
adequately pled liability under copyright infringement with evidence 
supporting the fact that all the defendants downloaded the same 
copyrighted work.109 The remaining issue is whether the joined defendants’ 
conduct arises “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences.”110 
The doctrine of secondary liability that exists in copyright 
infringement cases can bolster the proposition that “same transaction [or] 
occurrence” should include a defendant in BitTorrent cases who knew or 
had reason to know that her act contributed to infringement. Courts have 
found contributory infringement based on the “doctrine that one who 
knowingly participates or furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally 
 
 106. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 
 107. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); see Mosley v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332–33 (8th Cir. 1974); League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 108. See, e.g., Warner v. Rossignol, 513 F.2d 678, 684 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating that Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) 
commits sound discretion to the trial court as to whether to grant or deny separate trials); Mosley, 497 
F.2d at 1332 (citing Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Williams, 245 F.2d 397, 404 (8th Cir. 1957) 
(holding that the court has broad discretion in matters of Rule 20(b) and Rule 42(b) and that its ruling 
will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion)). 
 109. E.g., Third Degree Films v. Doe, No. 12-10760-FDS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159538, at *6 (D. 
Mass. Nov. 5, 2012) (“There is no question that there exist at least some questions of law or fact 
common to all defendants.”); Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Does 1–28, No. 12-cv-2599-WJM-MEH, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144501, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 5, 2012) (noting that users of twenty-eight IP addresses 
were identified that had downloaded a file with a specific hash number associated with the copyrighted 
work and that these “28 IP addresses were allegedly assigned to the 28 John Doe Defendants”). 
 110. E.g., Third Degree Films, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159538, at *6. 
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liable with the prime tortfeasor.”111 To successfully assert contributory 
infringement, a third-party—that is, a peer in a swarm—must directly 
infringe the plaintiff’s copyright, the defendant must materially contribute 
to the infringement, and the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant 
knew or had reason to know that the third party was directly infringing.112 
The main argument that all the joined defendants are acting 
concertedly “in the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions 
or occurrences” rests on BitTorrent’s unique method of file sharing. A 
plaintiff’s typical complaint lists a number of IP addresses, ranging from 
about twenty to more than a thousand, each corresponding to a Doe 
defendant that the plaintiff knew participated in a BitTorrent swarm.113 
Next to each IP address is a timestamp indicating the date and time at 
which forensic software observed that the IP address was involved in the 
file transfer.114 The plaintiff then verifies that the transferred file is their 
copyrighted work by downloading and watching part or the entire video 
file.115 The plaintiffs also allege that the same hash value was shared 
among all defendants’ files.116 A hash value is an alphanumeric value 
representing the “digital fingerprint” of a file.117 The same hash value 
among the files is evidence that the files are copied or downloaded from 
a single source118—the seeder of a swarm. As described in Part I, 
BitTorrent protocol mandatorily makes every user a provider of a file to 
other peers the moment it downloads a small piece of a file.119 Since each 
participant in the swarm acts as both a downloader and an uploader,120 the 
nature of the swarm is consistent with the notion of “same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” 
1.  Precedential Value of the RIAA Litigation 
Courts have looked to the previous massive Doe litigation brought 
by RIAA on behalf of the music industry for guidance because the 
RIAA cases are similar to the BitTorrent cases in many aspects. The 
 
 111. NCR Corp. v. Korala Assocs. Ltd., 512 F.3d 807, 816 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gershwin Publ’g 
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)); see Salton, Inc. v. Philips 
Domestic Appliances & Pers. Care B.V., 391 F.3d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying joint and several 
liability to federal copyright infringement). 
 112. Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833, 837 (3d Cir. 2007); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 113. See infra notes 144–145, 163–177. 
 114. See infra note 185. 
 115. E.g., Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 843 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566 (E.D. Pa. 2011); New Sensations, 
Inc. v. Does, No. C-11-2770-MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94909, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011). 
 116. See Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, 285 F.R.D. 273. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); infra note 127. 
 117. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 546–47 (D. Md. 2007). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See supra Part I. 
 120. See supra Part I. 
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RIAA cases, however, failed to produce a consensus on the issue of 
joinder. On one hand, courts that granted expedited discovery in the 
RIAA cases either postponed the issue of joinder for later analysis or 
found proper joinder at the time of the litigation.121 One argument is that 
having the defendants joined could even favor the defendants now that 
they can resort to a joint defense.122 On the other hand, many courts 
denied joinder, as the only factual allegation connecting all the 
defendants was that they used the same ISP or were connected to the 
same network on a university campus.123 RIAA would often attempt to 
join multiple defendants, each of whom would be implicated in infringing 
on different songs that belonged to different plaintiffs. Given this lack of 
connection among defendants and without more facts to relate the 
defendants in the “same transaction [or] occurrence,” courts concluded 
that being on the same network was insufficient for joinder.124 
The BitTorrent cases present several important distinguishing 
features from the previous RIAA cases that denied joinder.125 First, all 
BitTorrent users in a swarm both download and upload from each other 
simultaneously. Simultaneous file sharing in a swarm is absent from the 
P2P file-sharing protocols implicated in many of the RIAA cases involving 
older technologies, so the RIAA plaintiffs could not rely on the operation 
of the P2P protocol to support joinder.126 Second, the BitTorrent cases 
 
 121. Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Does 1–17, No. 07-6197-HO, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106461, at *7–8 
(D. Or. Sept. 25, 2008) (holding that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act is not the exclusive 
mechanism for the issuance of a subpoena and that the university must comply with discovery requests); 
see Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Does 1–12, No. 1:08-cv-1241-OWW-GSA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82548, 
at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2008) (finding that some courts have denied the requests for expedited 
discovery while others have granted them). 
 122. Arista Records L.L.C. v. Does, No. 1:08-CV-765 (GTS/RFT), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12159, at 
*28 (N.D.N.Y Feb. 18, 2009). See generally Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 
93 Calif. L. Rev. 685 (2005); Jonathan Reich, The Class Defense: Why Dispersed Intellectual Property 
Defendants Need Procedural Protections, 2010 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 9 (2010). 
 123. See, e.g., infra notes 126, 128. 
 124. See infra notes 126, 128. 
 125. E.g., Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does, No. 11-7248, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41645, at *12 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 23, 2012) (finding the BitTorrent cases factually distinguishable from cases involving older 
technologies). 
 126. See, e.g., IO Grp., Inc. v. Does, No. C 10-03851 SI, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133717, at *9 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) (finding misjoinder because the only factual allegation connecting the defendants 
was the allegation that they all used the “eDonkey 2000” P2P network to reproduce and distribute 
plaintiff’s copyrighted works); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Does 1–9, No. 07-1515, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27170, 
at *19 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2008) (finding misjoinder because none “of the Defendants downloaded 
and/or distributed the same copyrighted recordings belonging to the same set of Plaintiffs, and each of 
the Defendants accessed a different number of audio files on different dates”); Laface Records, L.L.C. 
v. Does 1–38, 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14544, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008) (granting 
severance because using the same ISP as well as some of the same P2P networks is not adequate for 
joinder); BMG Music v. Does, No. 3:06-cv-01579-MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53237, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
July 31, 2006) (finding misjoinder because the only connection between defendants was the fact that 
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implicate only one plaintiff alleging the copyright infringement of a 
single copyrighted work that is identified by a unique hash value shared 
among all the joined defendants’ files.127 In contrast, the RIAA cases 
often involved two or more plaintiffs alleging that the defendants 
downloaded illegal copies of multiple sound recordings.128 Accordingly, 
the circumstances surrounding the BitTorrent cases provide a stronger 
logical relationship among the claims against each defendant than 
previously asserted.129 
The key question is whether the intrinsic nature of the BitTorrent 
file-sharing scheme imputes liability to its users where the older P2P 
protocols did not. There are arguments on both sides. On the one hand, 
the interconnected nature necessary for BitTorrent usage can also be 
found in older generations of P2P protocols. For example, using an older 
generation of P2P file sharing, a user would “(1) index files into shared 
directories on a specific computer that can be searched for and transferred 
to other users; (2) search for files stored on other users’ computers; 
(3) transfer exact copies of files from one computer to another . . . ; and (4) 
allow [other] users to further distribute the files” in the network.130 These 
activities could very well connect all P2P users into an enterprise akin to 
 
defendants allegedly used the same ISP, Covad Communications, to conduct the infringing acts); 
Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Does 1–9, No. 04 Civ. 2289 (RWS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23560, at *16 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2004) (finding no logical relations to support a joinder because the only common 
questions of fact concerned the operation of NYU’s network and the Fast Track network); 
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Adrian, No. 03 C 6366, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8922, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2004) 
(stating that each defendant, apparently acting on his own and at different times, purchased various 
types of offending devices which were used in different ways); DIRECTV v. Loussaert, 218 F.R.D. 
639, 643–44 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (granting severance because having the offending device shipped 
through a common mailing facility did not satisfy the same transaction requirement of Rule 20). 
 127. But cf. Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–44, No. JFM 8:12-cv-00020, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47686, at *21 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2012) (“[W]hether the joined Doe defendants downloaded one work, or 
twenty, does not change the separate and discrete nature of their activity.”). 
 128. See, e.g., BMG Music v. Doe, No. 04-650, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8457, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 
2004) (finding no connection to maintain joinder, especially when, for example, one Doe is alleged to 
have infringed nine works held by five plaintiffs and another is alleged to have infringed ten works owned 
by a different group of plaintiffs); Interscope Records v. Does 1–25, No. 6:04-cv-197-Orl-22DAB, 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27782, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004) (finding misjoinder because none of the 
defendants disseminated the same copyrighted material or songs belonging to the same set of plaintiffs). 
 129. Some courts in the RIAA cases did note that if one defendant was to actually obtain the file 
from another defendant, there could be support for proper joinder. See, e.g., Fonovisa, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27170, at *17 (noting that facts tending to show that one or more of the defendants had 
actually downloaded songs from another defendant could conceivably link the defendants or show 
they acted in concert); Interscope Records, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27782, at *10 (holding that joinder 
was improper due to failure “to show how or which of the Defendants have actually downloaded 
Plaintiffs’ copyrighted songs from another Defendant (which could conceivably link such Defendants) 
as opposed to any other users of the systems”). 
 130. Arista Records L.L.C. v. Does 1–16, No. 1-08-CV-765 (GTS/RFT), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12159, at *4 (N.D.N.Y Feb. 18, 2009). 
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conspiracy. Thus there should be no reason to find jointly shared liability 
in one but not the other. 
On the other hand, BitTorrent coordinates each of the user activities 
mentioned above differently from older P2P protocols, and this 
coordination could support joinder while the older P2P protocols would 
not. First, in an older protocol, each of the user activities is often attributed 
to a different user, while BitTorrent mandates all users who download a 
file also be an uploader. More importantly, each user in an older protocol 
decides to undertake an activity on the network only on a voluntary basis. 
Second, making a file available and transferring a file from one location to 
another does not necessarily occur simultaneously for older protocols. 
Accordingly, it is understandable why joinder could be an insurmountable 
obstacle for plaintiffs battling older generations of P2P file sharing without 
evidence that any of the defendants’ activities were coordinated. 
The mandatory requirement that BitTorrent users simultaneously 
upload and download a file in a swarm can be persuasive that the file-
sharing activities of different users impute joint liability on everybody in 
the swarm. Based strictly on legal grounds, the BitTorrent plaintiffs here 
have provided enough evidence to obtain joinder for early discovery. 
Rule 20 merely requires that the subject matter is “in the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” Based 
on what the plaintiffs have alleged with respect to the method of the file 
sharing unique to BitTorrent, all the facts support the “same transaction” 
test.131 The nature of the swarm is no different from a group of people who 
are physically present to conspire in sharing an item. There is no reason 
why the same actions happening over cyberspace should be subject to a 
different joinder standard from activities that happen in a confined 
physical space—for example, a room where conspirers are physically 
present. Lastly, the fact that the presence of more peers in a BitTorrent 
swarm increases the likelihood of a successful download—and that one 
less peer can make the file transfer less efficient—strongly supports the 
conspiracy characteristics of the BitTorrent file-sharing activities.132 
Setting aside the file distribution scheme, a closer examination of 
actual human conduct may undercut the conspiracy theory necessary to 
the argument for joinder in BitTorrent cases. A typical BitTorrent user 
starts a computer program that runs the BitTorrent file-sharing protocol, 
finds a swarm to leech on, and starts a file transfer. One user probably 
does not make any direct human communication with any other users in 
the swarm—such as texting, phone calls, or Internet chats—in relation to 
 
 131. See supra Part II.B. 
 132. Boy Racer v. Does, No. C 11-02834 LHK (PSG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86746, at *8 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 5, 2011) (describing the plaintiff’s attempt to show a greater extent of “cooperation and 
concerted action” among BitTorrent users than among users of other protocols). 
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the file transfer, and does not know ahead of time the sources of the file 
from which she receives her copy.133 Some courts express doubt as to how 
timestamps corresponding to infringing activities that span several days 
or even months could reflect the same transaction or occurrence.134 One 
could even argue that the BitTorrent user lacks mental culpability because 
she does not know how the BitTorrent protocol creates a copy of the file 
for her. Merely looking at individual users in a swarm as persons, the 
human conduct of a BitTorrent user is no different from that of a user of 
an older P2P protocol. Accordingly, human conduct alone would not 
satisfy the traditional notions of “same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences.” What would make their activities those of the 
“same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” 
exists solely in the inner workings of the BitTorrent protocol. The protocol 
makes all the human conduct that would traditionally qualify an enterprise 
as a conspiracy unnecessary. Regardless of whether a user might 
knowingly be infringing on a copyright, it is less clear if clicking a mouse 
reflects an informed decision to participate in an activity that would 
ultimately lead to joint liability.135 
2. Fundamental Fairness in Joinder 
Even if the BitTorrent plaintiffs were to meet the two conditions set 
forth in Rule 20(a)(2), courts in several circuits have developed 
“fundamental fairness” as an additional requirement in a motion to sever 
or join a party.136 Relevant factors in a “fundamental fairness” analysis 
 
 133. See, e.g., SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Doe, No. 12 Civ. 3925 (SAS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84279, at 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2012) (finding that there is no allegation that the defendants “communicated or 
conspired with each other about their transactions”). 
 134. Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does 1–131, 280 F.R.D. 493, 498 (D. Ariz. 2012) (finding that a 
particular swarm “can last for many months,” during which time “the initial participants may never 
overlap with later participants”); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe 1–58, No. 3:11cv531-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 120235, at *5–6 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011); Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 
1150, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that activities occurring on different days and times over a two-
month period show that Doe Defendants may not have been physically present in the swarm on the 
exact same day and time). But cf. Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, 12 Civ. 2954 (NRB), 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 120855, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2012) (finding that eighty-eight days “does not undermine 
the interrelated nature of their actions,” as the “law of joinder does not have as a precondition that 
there be temporal distance or temporal overlap” (citing Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–21, No. 11 Civ 
1523, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57962 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2012))). 
 135. E.g., Hard Drive Prods., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1163 (“The bare fact that a Doe clicked on a 
command to participate in the BitTorrent Protocol does not mean that they were part of the 
downloading by unknown hundreds or thousands of individuals . . . .”). But cf. Tim Wu, When Code 
Isn’t Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 679, 707–08 (2003) (suggesting that computer software engineers design 
codes to take advantage of “loopholes and ambiguities in legal systems”). 
 136. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that courts must 
decide whether permissive joinder would “‘comport with the principles of fundamental fairness’ or 
would result in prejudice to either side” (citing Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 
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include: (1) possible prejudice that may result to any of the parties in the 
litigation; (2) possible jury confusion; (3) the motive that the moving party 
has in seeking the motion at issue; (4) the closeness of the relationship 
between the parties to be joined; (5) the effect of the motion on the court’s 
jurisdiction; (6) the presence of notice to parties; and (7) judicial 
efficiency.137 This analysis highlights the discretionary authority embodied 
in Rule 20 and also incorporates the principles propounded by Rule 
42(b) that allow courts to order separate trials for “convenience, to avoid 
prejudice, or to expedite and economize.”138 
While the BitTorrent plaintiffs might have a good legal reason to 
join multiple defendants based on the concerted nature of their actions 
mandated by the BitTorrent protocol, the “fundamental fairness” 
requirement could prove fatal to the attempt to maintain joinder. First, 
defendants could suffer prejudice having to litigate their cases together 
despite having different evidence and testimony specific to their 
circumstances.139 Each defendant would have to serve pleadings on other 
defendants and accommodate them during depositions.140 The prejudice 
is especially acute when many defendants reside out of the district or 
even out of the state.141 The fact that most defendants would appear pro 
se creates additional burdens at each step of the litigation process.142 
Second, joining multiple defendants could greatly undermine judicial 
economy and trial convenience, which are the original purposes of 
Rule 20.143 Assuming that joinder can efficiently resolve certain aspects of 
the case, there may be other logistical complications that outweigh the 
benefits of joinder. For example, courts facing BitTorrent cases often raise 
the concern that the many defendants sought to be joined creates a 
 
1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980)); McIntyre v. Codman & Shurtleff, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 619, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(asserting that joinder should comport with the principles of fundamental fairness and refusing to find 
plaintiff’s motive in adding parties was fundamentally unfair to defendant); Intercon Research 
Assocs., Ltd. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 696 F.2d 53, 57 (7th Cir. 1982) (dismissing Dresser Industries as a 
defendant in order to ensure fundamental fairness to all parties). 
 137. See, e.g., Desert Empire Bank, 623 F.2d at 1375 (noting that one other consideration is the 
delay of the moving party in seeking an amendment to his pleadings); Wynn v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 234 F. 
Supp. 2d 1067, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“[E]ven if Plaintiffs could somehow meet the minimum legal 
requirements for joinder, this Court would then exercise its discretion . . . to sever for at least two 
reasons: (1) to prevent jury confusion and judicial inefficiency, and (2) to prevent unfair prejudice to 
the Employer and Agency Defendants.”). 
 138. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). 
 139. Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 140. Id. 
 141. On the Cheap, L.L.C. v. Does 1–5011, No. C10-4472 BZ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99831, at 
*10–11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (pointing out the difficulties out-of-state and out-of-district 
defendants would face if required to appear in this court). 
 142. Hard Drive Prods., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. 
 143. See, e.g., League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th 
Cir. 1977). 
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daunting task for case management.144 The different ISPs and factual 
circumstances surrounding the alleged infringing activities unique to each 
defendant could result in different motion filings and defenses, all of which 
would have to be resolved one at a time.145 The problem is especially stark 
in cases where plaintiffs seek to join thousands of defendants. Finding a 
courtroom to hold that many parties for a case management conference 
provides a glimpse of potential logistical complications.146 
Third, joining multiple defendants can affect the court’s jurisdiction 
because courts may not have personal jurisdiction over every defendant. 
An Internet service subscriber identified by an IP address without any 
more information does not always guarantee that a court will have 
personal jurisdiction over her. In fact, many defendants are dismissed in 
later proceedings in BitTorrent cases because of lack of personal 
jurisdiction.147 Fourth, joining multiple defendants, each of whom may 
present different defenses or relate different factual circumstances 
surrounding the alleged infringing activities, can also create possible jury 
confusion at trial. 
However, concerns for lack of personal jurisdiction and jury 
confusion might be issues that are premature to entertain at this juncture 
of the litigation.148 At the pleading stage, where defendants are not named 
and plaintiffs have not even served the complaints, there are no concrete 
facts to assess jury confusion or personal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, both 
issues remain a potential problem down the road: As the number of joined 
defendants reaches the hundreds and higher, the probability of jury 
confusion and personal jurisdiction problems increases. A court is unlikely 
to take on a case only to dismiss it in the future. 
Factors such as the closeness of the relationship between the parties 
to be joined and the plaintiffs’ motives do not bode well for joinder 
either. It is undeniable that the relationship between the defendants 
exists solely in their use of the BitTorrent protocol to download a specific 
file. If the functionality of BitTorrent and how it differs from older P2P 
 
 144. See Tele-Media Co. of W. Conn. v. Antidormi, 179 F.R.D. 75, 76 (D. Conn. 1998) (finding 
that, although a single action reduced plaintiffs’ fees and costs, it imposed significant burdens on the 
clerk’s office, as each docketed order obligated the clerk to prepare and mail a copy of the order to 
every defendant who had appeared). 
 145. Hard Drive Prods., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1164 (“[The] courtroom could not accommodate all of 
the defendants and their attorneys, and therefore could not hold case management conferences . . . .”). 
 146. On the Cheap, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99831, at *9–10. 
 147. E.g., Millennium TGA v. Doe, No. 10 C 5603, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110135, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 26, 2011); DigiProtect USA Corp. v. Doe, No. 10 Civ. 5760, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109464, at 
*13–14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011). 
 148. See, e.g., IO Grp., Inc. v. Does, No. C 10-03851 SI, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133717, at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 7, 2010); Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Does 1–9, No. 04 Civ. 2289 (RWS), 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23560, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2004). 
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protocols are insufficient for the purpose of Rule 20 joinder, courts would 
be hard pressed to find “closeness of the relationship”149 beyond the use of 
BitTorrent. The plaintiffs’ motives also weigh against allowing joinder. 
Although unspoken, it is a common assumption that the plaintiffs’ main 
goal is to settle the claims out of court, and joinder provides economies 
of scale that make this endeavor profitable.150 If the motive of the 
plaintiffs is not exactly aligned with that of judicial economy and trial 
convenience, the self-serving motive of the plaintiffs probably cannot 
outweigh the other factors denying joinder. 
However, shifting the focus of the “fundamental fairness” inquiry 
from the future prospects of litigation to what is currently at stake could 
favor joinder. The future problems implicated by issues of prejudice and 
judicial economy would probably never arise given the plaintiffs’ motive to 
procure a settlement early on during litigation. Our judicial system 
traditionally encourages settlement out of court, and there is no reason to 
fault plaintiffs’ reluctance in pursuing claims to judgment.151 As such, while 
it could be unfair to the defendants to be joined in the face of their 
different circumstances, it is quite conceivable that those logistical 
problems might never become a reality.152 An uncertain cost in the future 
does not necessarily outweigh a present benefit to plaintiffs. 
There is also no requirement at this stage of the proceeding to require 
a plaintiff to file a case that will be completely free of case management 
issues in the future. Once joinder has been granted at the outset, Courts 
are not obligated to suffer judicial inefficiency when it arises later in a 
case.153 Rather, courts are free to sever and dismiss sua sponte, reviewable 
only on abuse of discretion. On the contrary, one could even find that 
joinder actually serves judicial efficiency because it is more manageable 
for ISPs to respond to a single subpoena for all the defendants—as 
opposed to requiring the plaintiff to file one suit per defendant and 
forcing ISPs to respond to one subpoena per defendant.154 
 
 149. Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 150. Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does, No. C-11-3826 DMR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132449, at *9 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011) (noting that the subpoena creates great potential for a coercive and unjust 
“settlement”); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–85, No. 3:11cv469-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124581, at *6 
(E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011) (“[T]he plaintiff has contacted [the defendants] directly with harassing telephone 
calls, demanding $2,900 in compensation to end the litigation.”); see Michael Roberts, BitTorrent Motion 
Alleges Legal Business Model Targeting Porn Downloaders, Denver Westword (Sept. 16, 2011, 12:13 
PM), http://blogs.westword.com/latestword/2011/09/porn_downloaders_bittorrent_lawsuit.php. 
 151. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. 
 152. See, e.g., Well Go USA, Inc. v. Unknown Participants in Filesharing Swarm Identified, No. 
4:12-cv-00963, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137272, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2012) (“The issue of joinder is 
better analyzed once unknown Defendants have been identified and served.”). 
 153. Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Does 1–15, No. 12-2077, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113704, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 10, 2012) (“[T]he Rules allow for re-examination as the case progresses.”). 
 154. Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, No. 12-CV-3161, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132813, at *8 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 
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Armed with the IP addresses as the only link to uncover the 
infringers, plaintiffs suffer a heavy burden from a denial of joinder that 
deprives them of the sole economically sustainable way to enforce their 
copyrights. Although employing joinder to efficiently obtain identification 
information may be a legitimate recourse, this application of joinder 
rules—in a way unintended by rulemakers—not only raises normative 
concerns but can also derogate court civil proceedings. 
C.  How Courts Have Responded 
The BitTorrent litigation has yielded a wide spectrum of court 
decisions, ranging from granting early discovery against joined defendants 
to severing all defendants but one.155 One of the oft-cited decisions 
granting early discovery comes from the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia. In Call of the Wild Movie, L.L.C. v. Does 1–1062, Time 
Warner Cable received subpoenas to disclose identity information 
corresponding to IP addresses submitted in three cases and subsequently 
filed a motion to quash.156 The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public 
Citizen, and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation submitted an 
amicus brief in support of Time Warner’s motion.157 The amici urged the 
court to address issues of improper joinder, lack of personal jurisdiction 
over the putative defendants, and the putative defendants’ First 
Amendment right to anonymity.158 In response, the court held that joinder 
was proper mainly because of the plaintiff’s allegations concerning the 
nature of the BitTorrent protocol. The court first noted that a 
determination of whether parties are properly joined pursuant to Rule 20 
depends on whether they are “logically related.”159 The court proceeded to 
 
18, 2012) (“Joinder at the discovery phase would be more efficient than conducting the same discovery in 
nine separate cases.”); Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does 1–108, No. DKC 11-3007, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
25400, at *17 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2012) (“[R]esponding to the subpoenas all at once is more manageable 
than severing the case into potentially over one hundred individual cases and requiring a concomitant 
number of separate subpoenas . . . .”); see Call of the Wild Movie, L.L.C. v. Does 1–1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 
332, 344 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Severance of the putative defendants associated with different IP addresses may 
subject the same Time Warner customer to multiple suits for different instances of allegedly infringing 
activity and, thus, would not be in the interests of the putative defendants.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Bubble Gum Prods., L.L.C. v. Doe, NO. 12-20367-CIV-SEITZ/SIMONTON, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100203, at *9–10 nn.5–6 (S.D. Fla. July 19, 2012) (collecting cases); Pac. Century Int’l 
v. Doe, 11 C 9064, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82796, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2012) (noting the split of 
authority in the Northern District of Illinois). 
 156. Call of the Wild Movie, L.L.C. v. Does 1–1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(ultimately holding that, in light of how the information subpoenaed is critical to the plaintiffs’ 
lawsuits, Time Warner Cable failed to demonstrate that the subpoenas were overly broad and unduly 
burdensome). 
 157. See Memorandum of Amici Curiae Elec. Frontier Found. et al., in Support of Third Party Time 
Warner Cable’s Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena, Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332. 
 158. Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 340. 
 159. Id. at 342 (citing Disparte v. Corporate Exec. Bd., 223 F.R.D. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2004)). 
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explain that in a BitTorrent network where every peer is obligated to 
share her file when downloading, “each putative defendant is a possible 
source for the plaintiffs’ motion pictures, and may be responsible for 
distributing the motion pictures to the other putative defendants.”160 In 
light of the flexibility of joinder rules to entertain broad claims, the court 
found these facts satisfied Rule 20.161 Additionally, the court found that 
at this procedural juncture, no defendants had been named or identified, 
and thus it was premature to decide on matters of personal jurisdiction or 
to evaluate the administrative burden going forward.162 
Many other decisions in other federal districts grant early discovery 
and often deny motions to quash subpoenas based on the reasoning set 
forth in Call of the Wild. They include decisions from the D.C. and 
Maryland districts,163 the eastern districts of Pennsylvania and Michigan,164 
and several others.165 A plaintiff in one case even moved to sanction the 
defendant’s attorney for presenting allegedly frivolous arguments in 
support of a motion to quash.166 Although the court in that case ultimately 
denied the motion for sanctions, this is one extreme end of the wide 
spectrum of rulings across the country, where plaintiffs are not only 
favored but also emboldened. 
Notably, in districts where courts often grant early discovery, 
plaintiffs are also successful in joining strikingly large numbers of 
defendants. While the number of defendants sought to be joined has 
varied widely and has been as low as five,167 the D.C. district has received a 
 
 160. Id. at 343. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 347–48. 
 163. E.g., Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–1,495, No. 11-1741 (JDB/JMF), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
137719 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2012); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–39, No. 12-cv-00096-AW, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 57187 (D. Md. Apr. 23, 2012); Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does 1–108, No. DKC 11-3007, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25400 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2012); K-Beech, Inc. v. Doe, No. 11-cv-01774-AW, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 136757 (D. Md. Nov. 29, 2011); Voltage Pictures, No. 10-0873 (BAH), L.L.C. v. Doe, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50787 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011); W. Coast Prods. v. Doe, 275 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 164. See, e.g., Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, No. 12-2078, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143378 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 3, 2012); Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, No. 12-2077, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113704 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 10, 2012); Third Degree Films v. Doe, No. 11-cv-15200, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87891 (E.D. Mich. 
May 29, 2012); Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does, No. 11-7248, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41645 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 
2012); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 282 F.R.D. 161 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–
28, 286 F.R.D. 319 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 165. For example, in New York, Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Does 1–5, 12 Civ. 2950 (JPO), 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 77469 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012); in Massachusetts, Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–36, 286 
F.R.D. 160 (D. Mass. 2012); in Florida, Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-266-FtM-29DNF, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129163 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012); in Texas, Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does, No. H-12-
0699, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44810 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2012); and in California, Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. 
Does 1–59, No. 1cv12-0888 AWI DLB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137654 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2012). 
 166. Maverick Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Doe, 276 F.R.D. 389, 395 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 167. Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, No. 12 Civ. 2964 (JPO), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77486 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 1, 2012) (attempting to join five defendants); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–11, No. 11-cv-01776-
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number of cases in which the number of defendants to be joined is 
staggeringly high.168 On numerous occasions, plaintiffs have sought to join 
five thousand or more defendants—as many as 24,583 in one case.169 This is 
evidence that the joinder and jurisdictional problems that necessarily 
derive from such a large group of defendants have not deterred certain 
courts from granting early discovery. There are a few cases from the 
District Court for the District of Columbia, however, where the court 
questioned the joinder of a large number of defendants and subsequently 
denied discovery on jurisdictional grounds.170 In Nu Image, Inc. v. Doe, 
the court denied joining 23,322 defendants because a good faith showing 
at least requires the plaintiff to resort to geolocation technology in an 
attempt to locate the IP addresses to a locale within the court’s 
jurisdiction, which the plaintiff failed to do.171 The court reasoned that 
because the sole claim was copyright infringement, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a) 
governed venue for claims asserted under the Copyright Act and 
required an action to enforce the Act be brought in a judicial district “in 
which the defendant or his agent resides or may be found.”172 Despite an 
acknowledgment that the plaintiff sought to identify all the infringers 
conveniently and cheaply, the court held that discovery should be denied 
if the information would be used in another lawsuit in a different 
venue.173 Although early discovery was denied based on jurisdiction, the 
court did not address the issue of joinder. 
Decisions from the Eastern District of Virginia fall at the other end of 
the spectrum. A handful of cases are representative.174 All the defendants 
 
AW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128889 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2011) (attempting to join eleven defendants). 
 168. See Nu Image, Inc. v. Doe, No. 2:11-cv-545-FtM-29SPC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72402 (M.D. 
Fla. May 9, 2012) (implicating more than three thousand defendants). Such decisions favoring plaintiff 
did not go unnoticed in the public sphere. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, RIAA Lobbyist Becomes Federal 
Judge, Rules on File-Sharing Cases, Ars Technica (Mar. 28, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/ 
2011/03/riaa-lobbyist-becomes-federal-judge-rules-on-file-sharing-cases. 
 169. Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, No. 11-cv-01776-AW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128889 (D. Md. 
Nov. 8, 2011); Voltage Pictures, L.L.C. v. Vazquez, No. 10-00873 (BAH), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
121316 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2011); W. Coast Prods. v. Doe, 275 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 170. Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1–23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2011); People Pictures v. Group 
of Participants in Filesharing Swarm Identified by Hash, No. 11-1968 (JEB/JMF), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 147859, at *7–9 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2011) (denying a discovery request because of the lack of 
information establishing personal jurisdiction and venue). 
 171. Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 41. 
 172. Id. at 37. 
 173. Id. at 41 (citing Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 353 n.17 (1978)). 
 174. See, e.g., Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–30, No. 2:11cv345, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119333 
(E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2011); K-Beech, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3:11cv469-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124581 
(E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011); Raw Films, Ltd. v. Doe, No. 3:11cv532-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114996 
(E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–58, No. 3:11cv531-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
120235 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011). The only other district in which all decisions consistently deny joinder 
is the Western District of Louisiana, although that district receives many fewer BitTorrent litigation 
cases than those that lack a consensus. E.g., Twenty Media Inc. v. Swarm Sharing Hash Files, No. 6:12-
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the plaintiffs sought to join in each case numbered fewer than one 
hundred. Except for one case,175 most courts did not look favorably upon 
the plaintiffs’ attempt to obtain early discovery. Describing the plaintiffs’ 
demands for monetary settlements as reprehensible and threatening 
behavior, courts in these cases went as far as to order the attorneys to 
show cause why they should not be sanctioned for using the “offices of 
the Court as an inexpensive means to gain the Doe defendants’ personal 
information and coerce payment from them.”176 The courts then severed 
the parties, finding the BitTorrent “swarm theory” insufficient to satisfy 
joinder.177 
Between the two extremes—where at one end the defendant’s 
attorney could be sanctioned and at the other the plaintiff’s attorney is at 
risk—lie the remaining districts. The Northern District of California has 
had a particularly high number of BitTorrent cases. This large sample 
size presents a wide range of reasoning and legal grounds for court 
decisions.178 Although other districts, such as the Southern District of 
New York,179 the Northern District of Illinois,180 and the District of 
Colorado,181 have ruled on a significant number of BitTorrent cases, they 
often cite to cases decided in the Northern District of California with 
similar underlying reasons for their decisions.182 
Most districts, including the Northern District of California, are 
currently split on whether to grant early discovery against joined 
defendants.183 During early 2011, a number of cases were granted early 
 
cv-00031, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123163 (W.D. La. Aug. 17, 2012). 
 175. See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Doe, No. 2:11cv345, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73159, at *4–5 
(E.D. Va. July 1, 2011) (granting early discovery on the grounds of irreparable harm). 
 176. Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does 1–32, No. 3:11cv532-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114996, at *6 (E.D. 
Va. Oct. 5, 2011); see Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–30, No. 2:11cv345, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
119333, at *9 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2011); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–85, No. 3:11cv469-JAG, No. 3:11cv531-
JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124581, at *6 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–58, 
No. 3:11cv531-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120235, at *7 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011). 
 177. Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–30, No. 2:11cv345, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119333, at *6 
(E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2011). 
 178. See infra notes 184–187, 189–192. 
 179. E.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Does 1–30, 12 Civ. 3782 (LTS)(JLC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
135468 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2012) (permitting joinder); Zero Tolerance Entm’t, Inc. v. Doe, No. 12 Civ. 
1083 (SAS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78834 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2012) (severing defendants). 
 180. E.g., Pac. Century Int’l v. Doe, 11 C 9064, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82796 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 
2012) (finding joinder proper); Millennium TGA Inc. v. Does 1–800, 10 C 5603, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
35406 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011) (severing defendants). 
 181. E.g., Sunlust Pictures, L.L.C. v. Cisa, No. 12-cv-00656-CMA-KMT, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
150835 (D. Colo. Oct. 19, 2012) (finding joinder proper); Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Does 1–28, No. 12-
cv-2599-WJM-MEH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144501 (D. Colo. Oct. 5, 2012) (finding joinder improper). 
 182. See supra note 181. 
 183. See, e.g., Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 1–27, No. 12 Civ. 3755 (VM), 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 107648, at *11–18 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2012); Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Doe, No. DKC 11-3007, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59233, at *5–7 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2012) (collecting cases). 
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discovery because the courts found that the pleadings satisfied the “good 
cause” standard, as well as the Seescandy.com factors.184 However, not long 
after BitTorrent cases started flooding into the district, courts started to 
question the validity of the BitTorrent “swarm” theory.185 Looking to 
earlier Doe litigation cases launched by the music industry, many courts 
started to sever the defendants, asserting that the architecture of 
BitTorrent is not enough to distinguish itself from older P2P technologies.186 
In a case where the plaintiff attempted to join 162 putative defendants, the 
court noted that even if all the IP addresses derived from a single swarm, 
“the lack of information regarding the period [including all the timestamps 
corresponding to] the activity associated with each of the addresses” and 
the lack of “proof that bits from each of these 162 addresses were ever 
assembled into a single file” undermined the proposition that there was 
common activity linking all the 162 addresses in the case.187 Since certain 
precedents held that employing the same P2P protocol was insufficient for 
joinder, these BitTorrent cases should not compel a different result.188 
Based on such reasoning, file transfer among users, all of whom both 
download and upload a single file from each other on a network, would 
not satisfy the “same transaction [or] occurrence” standard unless the 
plaintiffs can describe all transfer steps to trace all the direct and indirect 
sources of every “block” of the file owned by each user. Based on the 
current forensic software, plaintiffs are unlikely to obtain evidence 
detailing such a level of specificity. 
Starting in mid-2011, an increasing number of courts started severing 
parties by analogizing to cases that involved older P2P technologies.189 
 
 184. E.g., Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does, No. C-11-01956 EDL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105229 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011); Millennium TGA v. Does, No. 11-2258 SC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80065 
(N.D. Cal. July 22, 2011); Boy Racer, Inc. v. Doe, No. 5:11-cv-02833 EJD (PSG), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 79735 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2011); Pink Lotus Entm’t, L.L.C. v. Does 1–46, No. C-11-02263 HRL, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65614 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2011); VPR Internationale v. Doe, No. C 11-01494 
LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45118 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2011). 
 185. E.g., Diabolic Video Prods. v. Does 1–2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58351, 
at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011); Millennium TGA, Inc. v. Does 1–21, No. 11-2258 SC, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 53465, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2011) (stating that the decentralization of BitTorrent leading to 
vicarious liability is an unsupported and novel legal theory). For a change in the trend in the District of 
Maryland over time, see Malibu Media v. Does 1–34, No. PJM 12-1195, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67567 (D. 
Md. May 11, 2012) (severing defendants); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–11, No. 11-cv-01776-AW, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128889 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2011) (denying motion to quash). 
 186. Diabolic Video Prods. v. Does 1–2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58351, at 
*12–13 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011). 
 187. Media Prods. v. Does 1–162, No.: C 12-03801 EJD (PSG), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134226, at 
*12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012). 
 188. See supra notes 126, 128. But cf. supra notes 121–122. 
 189. Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Does 1–13, No. 2:12-cv-01513 JAM DAD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
148215 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2012); Smash Pictures v. Does, No. 2:12-cv-301 JAM CKD, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 82985 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2012); Liberty Media Holdings, L.L.C. v. BitTorrent Swarm, No. 
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Certain cases where early discovery had previously been granted against 
joined defendants now had their defendants severed.190 As an alternative 
to finding joinder improper based on the test of common transaction or 
occurrence, some courts resort to the discretionary power grounded in the 
“fundamental fairness” doctrine to sever the parties in the name of judicial 
economy and case manageability.191 Other courts in the same district, 
however, remain persuaded that BitTorrent technology is sufficiently 
different, and thus joinder is proper at this juncture of the litigation.192 
Some decisions were crafted to be tentative, seemingly in an attempt 
to narrow holdings to specific circumstances. Courts that severed based on 
jurisdictional grounds opened up the possibility that early discovery might 
be granted against defendants whose IP addresses could be located within 
the district.193 Indeed some courts decided to grant early discovery once the 
plaintiffs submitted additional information—for example, to support the 
assertion that all IP addresses were traced to the same “swarm” or 
information regarding the locations of the IP addresses.194 Courts also 
 
1:11-cv-21567-KMM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135847, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2011); Liberty Media 
Holdings, L.L.C. v. BitTorrent Swarm, No. 1:11-cv-21525-KMM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126333, at *7 
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2011); Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1–60, No. C 11-01738 SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
92994, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011); McGip, L.L.C. v. Does 1–149, No. C 11-02331 LB, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 85363, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011); Pac. Century Int’l Ltd. v. Does 1–101, No. C-11-
02533-(DMR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73837, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011); Lightspeed v. Does 1–
1000, 10 C 5604, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35392, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011). 
 190. Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–84, No. C11-03648 HRL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135565, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2011). 
 191. See, e.g., On the Cheap, L.L.C. v. Does 1–5011, No. C10-4472 BZ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
99831, at *10–11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011); Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 
1164 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  
 192. See, e.g., First Time Videos, L.L.C. v. Does 1–95, No. C 11-3822 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
116434 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); New Sensations, Inc. v. Does 1–1474, No. C 11-2770 MEJ, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 94909 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011); McGip v. Doe, NO: 11-CV-03679 EJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 87913 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011); Millennium TGA v. Does, No. 11-2258 SC, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 80065 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2011; New Sensations, Inc. v. Doe, No. C 10-05863 WHA, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 132519 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2011). 
 193. Millennium TGA v. Doe, No. 10 C 5603, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110135, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
26, 2011) (dismissing the case for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the fact that the geolocation 
service indicated that the IP addresses were located outside of Illinois); DigiProtect USA Corp. v. 
Doe, No. 10 Civ. 5760, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109464, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) (dismissing the 
case because the plaintiff does not bear the burden of demonstrating that the IP addresses are 
connected to New York, despite the availability of free, publicly available technology that matches IP 
addresses to a geographic region); Lightspeed v. Does 1–1000, 10 C 5604, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
35392, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011) (finding no reason why venue should have been in this district 
and no demonstration that the IP addresses were located in Illinois). 
 194. Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 12-CV-00126 (AJN), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10803 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
30, 2012) (declining to sever because the defendants were trading the exact same file as part of the same 
swarm); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–57, No. 2:11-CV-00358-FtM-36SPC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132834, at *9 
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2011) (finding that jurisdiction is proper because “Plaintiff took care to ensure that the 
IP addresses at issue in this case could be traced to a physical address located within this District”); 
OpenMind Solutions, Inc. v. Doe, No. C 11-3311 MEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116552, at *6, 17–18 (N.D. 
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tentatively granted early discovery because the time stamps that indicated 
the time at which the infringing activities were observed did not span more 
than two weeks, or the number of defendants sought to be joined was 
sufficiently small.195 Alternatively, in exchange for granting joinder, at least 
one court has precluded plaintiffs from direct communication with the 
defendants without the court’s permission out of concern for improper 
negotiation practices.196 These various approaches can influence plaintiffs’ 
strategies in order to obtain early discovery against joined defendants. 
Conclusion 
Although the BitTorrent protocol provides its users a unique 
environment where their conduct can legally meet the “same transaction 
[or] occurrence” test under Rule 20, this application of Rule 20 may be 
unsettling for normative reasons. The tension between the proper 
exercise of a legal right and reprehensibly predatory behavior underlies 
the lack of consensus among the courts. Since joinder rules poorly 
address the normative concerns raised by the BitTorrent litigation, courts 
developed diverse reasoning—including joinder, personal jurisdiction, 
and venue—in an attempt to rationalize severing the defendants. For 
example, one main reason is that IP addresses do not always definitively 
link to an infringer. Courts find the evidence inadequate because ISP 
“subscriber John Doe 1 could be an innocent parent whose Internet 
access was abused by her minor child, while John Doe 2 might share a 
computer with a roommate who infringed Plaintiffs’ works,” and as such, 
clicking a command to participate in a swarm is inadequate for joinder.197 
 
Cal. Oct. 7, 2011) (noting that the plaintiff had traced all IP addresses within the state of California, as 
well as the fact that the hash associated with the file remains the same within the swarm). 
 195. Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Does 1–14, No. 1:12-CV-263, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174384, at *25 
(N.D. Ind. Dec. 10, 2012) (granting joinder for a case involving only fourteen defendants located in the 
district); AF Holdings L.L.C. v. Does 1–96, No. C-11-03335 JSC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134655, *10–11 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (noting that the time stamps spanned a two-week period and thus the plaintiff 
had made a prima facie showing that the Doe defendants were properly joined at this time of the 
litigation); Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Doe, No. C 11-01567 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130055, at *9 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (noting that case management concerns were no longer present given that there were 
only two Does present); MCGIP, L.L.C. v. Doe, No. C-11-1495 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64188, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011) (denying motion to quash and noting that only eighteen defendants were sought 
to be joined). But cf. New Sensations, Inc. v. Doe, No. 12-3800 JSC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142032, at 
*21–22 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012) (denying joinder on manageability grounds); Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. 
Does 1–188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying joinder because different timestamps 
over a period of two weeks did not support participation in the same swarm at the same time). 
 196. W. Coast Prods. v. Does 1–1434, No. 11-55 (JEB/JMF), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110847, at 
*24–25 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2012) (precluding the plaintiff from communicating directly with the Doe 
defendants prior to plaintiff’s naming these individuals as actual defendants in the complaint and 
imposing a “good faith requirement” to name defendants who are D.C. residents). 
 197. Third Degree Films v. Doe, No. C 11-02768 LB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128030, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 4, 2011); Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, 12 Civ. 2950 (JPO), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77469, at *3 
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Although IP addresses do not guarantee a successful claim against the 
subscriber of that Internet service, they are still the best means by which 
plaintiffs can initiate litigation and further their investigative efforts at 
this stage. There is no requirement that a certain percentage of the 
defendants joined in a case must turn out to be actual infringers.198 
Especially when the defendants are not identified, it seems premature to 
consider the potential activities of each defendant and the corresponding 
impact on joinder.199 Nevertheless, probably out of normative concerns, 
courts do go to lengths such as this to defeat the BitTorrent plaintiffs’ 
prima facie cases for joinder. 
A major concern is that the BitTorrent plaintiffs’ main goal to 
compel settlements after obtaining identification information is to harass 
and threaten innocent people. Many courts and the general public often 
characterize plaintiffs’ communications to defendants as coercive. 
Allowing joinder and early discovery would be unfair to innocent 
defendants who feel the need to pay the settlement amount solely to 
avoid harassment—recall the grandmother with an unsecured wireless 
network.200 Although the grandmother story might not be representative 
of most putative defendants, it is illustrative that any number of innocent 
defendants could be vulnerable to such litigation tactics.201 As some 
courts have indicated, the “potential for coercing unjust settlements from 
innocent defendants trumps [the plaintiff’s] interest in maintaining low 
litigation costs.”202 Other courts are less subtle and have directly charged 
plaintiffs of using the “offices of the Court as an inexpensive means to 
gain the Doe defendants’ personal information and coerce payment from 
them.”203 A related concern is that, in joining multiple defendants, 
 
(S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012) (noting that illegal downloads “from a certain IP address do[] not necessarily 
mean that the owner of that IP address was the infringer”); In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright 
Infringement Cases, No. 11-3995(DRH)(GRB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61447, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 
2012) (“[T]he assumption that the person who pays for Internet access at a given location is the same 
individual who allegedly downloaded a single sexually explicit film is tenuous . . . .”). 
 198. Digital Sin, Inc. v. Doe, 12-CV-00126 (AJN), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10803, at *9–10 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012) (stating that “Plaintiff’s counsel estimated that 30% of the names turned over 
by ISPs are not those of individuals who actually downloaded or shared copyrighted material” as a 
reason to issue a protective order to accompany the subpoena). 
 199. See, e.g., Malibu Media, L.L.C. v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-266-FtM-29DNF, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
129163, at *21 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (dismissing motion to sever as premature). 
 200. Hamilton, supra note 35. 
 201. Temple, supra note 36. 
 202. K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–41, No. V-11-46, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31803, at *15 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 
8, 2012); see Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–130, No. C-11-3826 DMR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
132449, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011) (“[T]he potential to draw numerous innocent Internet users 
into the litigation[] plac[es] a burden upon them that outweighs Plaintiff’s need for discovery.”). 
 203. K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–85, No. 3:11cv469-JAG, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124581, at *6–7 (E.D. 
Va. Oct. 5, 2011); see New Sensations, Inc. v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-1885-GEB-EFB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
149786, at *11 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012) (noting that “federal courts are not cogs in a plaintiff’s 
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plaintiffs avoid paying the court filing fees required in an application for 
early discovery that are supposed to be filed for each defendant.204 Courts 
find that “postponing a determination on joinder” would subject the 
government to “lost revenue of perhaps millions of dollars.”205 
As for plaintiffs’ practice of coercing innocent defendants, it would 
be helpful if there were informative statistics as to the over-inclusiveness 
of a typical group of defendants that plaintiffs try to join. It is not clear if 
the harassment of innocent people is a cost the society is willing to pay in 
exchange for this scheme of copyright enforcement.206 Alternatively, in an 
effort to prevent abusive settlement practice, courts can also appoint ad 
litem counsel to represent the Doe defendants.207 However, this is still a 
burden on our judicial system in an attempt to resist the predatory 
behavior of plaintiffs that does not ultimately resolve the underlying 
problem. 
Lastly, using joinder rules solely to gather identification information 
cheaply during early discovery confounds the real purpose of joinder. 
The purpose of joinder is to entertain the broadest possible scope of 
action for “judicial economy and trial convenience.”208 When copyright 
owners resort to the courts, it is financially worthwhile only if civil 
procedure joinder rules are employed for an unintended purpose—not to 
truly litigate, but to obtain identification information from IP addresses. If 
the only intention of the plaintiff is to obtain identification information, 
the concerns of “judicial economy and trial convenience” are entirely 
inapposite. Ultimately, when acquisition of confidential information 
 
copyright-enforcement business model” and that the court “will not idly watch what is essentially an 
extortion scheme”); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–41, No. V-11-46, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31803, at *17 
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2012) (noting that enforcing copyright in “a cost-effective manner does not justify 
perverting the joinder rules”). 
 204. Arista Records L.L.C. v. Doe, 589 F. Supp. 2d 151, 154 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 205. In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, No. 11-3995(DRH)(GRB), 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61447, at *38 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012) (noting that plaintiffs attempt to “limit their 
expenses as against the amount of settlements they are able to negotiate”); Arista Records, L.L.C. v. 
Doe, No. 1:07-CV-2828, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90183, at *17 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2008); Arista 
Records, L.L.C. v. Does 1–27, No. CV-07-162-B-W, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6241, at *19–21 n.5 (D. Me. 
Jan. 25, 2008) (suggesting that plaintiffs might have violated Rule 11 by alleging that joinder is proper 
in order to avoid paying filing fees).  
 206. Cf. Media Prods. v. Does, No. 12 Civ. 3719 (HB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125366, at *10 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2012) (“[S]ettlements are for notoriously low amounts relative to the possible 
statutory damages, but high relative to the low value of the work and minimal costs of mass 
litigation.”). 
 207. E.g., Mick Haig Prods., e.K. v. Does, No. 3:10-CV-1900-N, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128366, at 
*5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2011). 
 208. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); see Mosley v. Gen. Motors, 497 F.2d 
1330, 1332–33 (8th Cir. 1974); League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 
914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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replaces the resolution of a dispute in court as the real purpose, the 
integrity and purpose of the courts are left in question. 
In the absence of an appropriate legislative response to P2P 
copyright infringement,209 courts and plaintiffs are left battling with legal 
gymnastics. Congress had previously introduced a bill, SOPA, in an 
attempt to stem copyright infringement by targeting websites that index 
sources of copyrighted files available for download on P2P networks.210 
In effect, without the websites, finding files to download can prove 
laborious for P2P users. However, neither SOPA nor its successor, 
OPEN,211 managed to draw enough support to make it out of the House. 
Despite these laudable, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to curb the activities 
of indexing websites, a future bill should anticipate that technology will 
soon evolve to circumvent the need for indexing websites.212 It is 
important for the new copyright legislation to rely less on technology-
related aspects for its effectiveness in order to impart some resilience in 
countering the ever-changing nature of technology. 
  
 
 209. While § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act allows subpoena of identification 
information outside of litigation, this may not apply to the BitTorrent plaintiffs because of how certain 
courts have interpreted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act safe harbor provisions together with the 
subpoena provisions. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2012) (exempting certain service providers that do not 
provide storage, a category into which the ISPs implicated in the BitTorrent litigation would fall); id. 
§ 512(h) (“A copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the owner’s behalf may request the clerk 
of any United States district court to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an alleged 
infringer . . . . The request may be made by filing with the clerk . . . a copy of a notification described in 
subsection (c)(3)(A); a proposed subpoena; and a sworn declaration to the effect that the purpose for 
which the subpoena is sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information 
will only be used for the purpose of protecting rights under this title.”). 
 210. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(a) (2011); Protect IP Act, S. 968, 112th 
Cong. § 3 (2011); Jacquelin D. Lipton, Law of the Intermediated Information Exchange, 64 Fla. L. 
Rev. 1337, 1338 (2012) (critiquing the Stop Online Piracy Act). 
 211. Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, H.R. 3782, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 212. Computer science research to decentralize keyword search is ongoing. See, e.g., Cubit an 
Approximate Matching Peer-to-Peer Overlay, Cubit Project, http://www.cs.cornell.edu/~bwong/cubit 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2013); Tibler Makes BitTorrent Impossible to Shut Down, TorrentFreak (Feb. 8, 
2012), http://torrentfreak.com/tribler-makes-bittorrent-impossible-to-shut-down-120208; Tibler Set to 
Make BitTorrent Sites Obsolete, TorrentFreak (Oct. 28, 2008), http://torrentfreak.com/tribler-set-to-
make-bittorrent-sites-obsolete-081028. 
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